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The Next Time the World Goes Downhill: America and the 1983 Ethiopian 
Famine 
BETHANY SHARPE 
University of Kentucky 
 
Introduction 
On December 10, 1985, Ronald Reagan signed a proclamation establishing a 
Human Rights Day in the United States. During the ceremony, he said that 
“America has, since its founding, been a refuge for those suffering under the yoke 
of oppression.” As if to further persuade his audience of the importance of this 
refuge in contemporary world politics, Reagan described governments throughout 
the world that, according to him, stood in antipathy to U.S. liberal-democratic 
values. He wrote of Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Nicaragua. He also wrote of 
Ethiopia. He said, in particular reference to Ethiopia, that this was a “Marxist 
government that used famine to punish large segments of its own 
population…And the people and governments of the democracies have responded 
generously to those pleas with tangible evidence of our concern.”1 Although the 
famine began in 1983 with counter-insurgency strategies instituted by Ethiopian 
leader Chairman Mengistu in the Northern regions of the country, two years 
passed before attention in the United States focused on the great humanitarian 
emergency taking place within that country.2 The increased attention culminated 
in the great LiveAid and Band Aid concerts and “We are the world” recording 
which garnered over sixty million dollars intended for African famine relief.3 The 
songs, resulting concerts, and the outcry about famine conditions proved much 
more than a straightforward relief effort. The humanitarian aid, referred to as 
“tangible evidence of our concern” by Reagan, were as much about articulating a 
specific vision of a future world as it was about providing immediate relief to 
broken and vulnerable bodies so far away.  
This paper argues that the vision of a future world articulated by media, 
government, and aid groups coalesced around the transformation of Ethiopian 
famine victims from “unenlightened” peoples into world citizens that would act as 
torchbearers of liberal values, attitudes, and behaviors.4 In short, relief efforts 
                                                          
1
 “Remarks on Signing the Bill of Rights Day and the Human Rights Day and Week 
Proclamation,” http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=36797 , accessed April 4, 2015.  
2
 Alexander De Waal, Evil Days: Thirty Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia (New York: Human 
Rights Watch, 1991).  
3
 Jonathan Benthall, Disasters, Relief, and Media (UK: Sean Kingston Press, 2010).  
4
 In a draft response to a letter proposing a regional food crisis center, Executive Secretary 
Malcolm Butler wrote that he strongly urged the author to consider a more subtle approach to food 
crises by working with those “African states choosing to implement improved agronomic practices 
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acted as a beacon of hope for a unified world that conformed to these liberal 
principles. The management of the aid effort through the consumption of media 
images and the public’s purchasing power remained critical to that 
transformation. In the moment of humanitarian crisis that was the Ethiopian 
famine, the three varied forces of media, private non-profits, and government 
commingled to entrench a specific liberal understanding of the future world order 
that recognized individual choice, goal-tending, and personal accountability as the 
necessary ingredients to promote global progress.5 Ultimately, this world of 
thriving competition would render disasters like the famine obsolete. As media 
images and documentaries depicted the glaring reality of death in the refugee 
camps, relief efforts invited the public to participate in the emergency through 
purchasing power, and the humanitarian response generated specific claims on 
those receiving aid. The specific nature of this invitation allowed Americans to 
use the famine as an opportunity to remake and redefine visions of progress 
abroad.  
In addition, this paper will discuss the conservative Cold War ideology 
that underpinned much of the future world vision that these three groups shared. 
The Cold War discourse used by all three groups to discuss the famine relied on a 
specific narrative in which communist and socialist countries subordinated the 
freedoms and liberties of the individual to the state which resulted in tyrannical 
rule. Just as importantly, such Cold War discourse framed liberal democracies 
like the United States as heroes who could, should, and would intervene on behalf 
of oppressed people. Indeed, Cold War ideas acted as an influential motivator for 
the public and media to pursue humanitarian aid. Even as both groups seemingly 
viewed the emergency as one which highlighted the basic equality of all humanity 
and rushed to meet the basic needs of man, it was Cold War politics that moved to 
the media, the U.S. government, and the public to act.6  
Africa Redux: Media images and the need for aid 
Media coverage of the famine surged in the fall of 1984 after American news 
stations picked up footage shot by the BBC of a refugee camp in Korem, Ethiopia. 
English reporter Michael Buerk first broke the story of the famine when he found 
his way into the camp in October and began reporting on the huge numbers of 
people traveling to the area in search of food. As he described the scene as one of 
a “biblical famine…now in the twentieth century,” cameras panned out to show 
                                                                                                                                                               
and enlightened agricultural policies.” December 26, 1984, NARA RECORD GROUP 286.  The 
final version of the draft had replaced the phrase “more appropriate” agricultural policies. 
5
 Emily Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982): 8-9. I 
place Rosenberg’s conception of expansion in the context of emergency situations.  
6
 Didier Fassin, Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present Times, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2012). 
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thousands of bodies covered in blankets huddled next to each other. At other 
moments, the camera panned in to show close-ups of children crying, fear written 
across their faces. In other scenes, viewers saw mothers holding tiny babies in an 
attempt to breast-feed even though no milk remained in mothers’ malnourished 
bodies. The cameras highlighted the acute frustration of the babies as they cried 
out at the lack of milk. Within the same scene, fathers walked through the crowds 
carrying the shrouded, tiny bodies of babies that had died, seemingly from lack of 
food.7 Graphic images stunned audiences by showing starving Ethiopians literally 
dying in front of the camera.8  
As Fassin suggests in his theorization of humanitarianism, observers of the 
famine engaged with suffering at a distance, they did so only in highly qualified 
ways within well-defined and rigid boundaries.  Media renderings of Ethiopians 
as a monolithic bloc of suffering allowed the reader to create their own narrative 
about the event and attach their own assumptions about the photos and images 
they saw, including the understanding of Ethiopia as a nation of innocent, 
dependent, and helpless children.9 A smaller photo inserted next to the burial 
preparation photo in the Life article, reinforced this theme as it showed a man 
gently placing his recently deceased four year-old daughter on a blanket.10 Like 
the burial photo of the woman discussed above, the central point of concern is the 
death of the child and the inability of the parent to prevent such an end. Readers 
only learn very briefly the age and name of the daughter, but no more which 
facilitated a connection to the images based on the imagining of a shared pain.  
The limited textual context given about the victims allowed observers to 
rely on their own understandings of the world to make sense of the images.11 In 
this way, they disengaged with the full context of the victims’ lives, ignoring the 
complexity and historicity of the political situation facing the victims, by relying 
on their own understandings of the pain the victims faced.12 Little mention was 
made, for instance, of the continuous warfare that had been raging since at least 
the early 1960s between the Ethiopian government and its provinces in the north 
                                                          
7
 Michael Buerk News Report of Ethiopia, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XYOj_6OYuJc, 
accessed August 1, 2014. 
8
 Joseph Berger, “Offers of Aid for Stricken Ethiopia Are Pouring into Relief Agencies,” New 
York Times, October 28, 1984. 
9
 Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2003): 22-
23.  
10
 David Breskin, “There Comes a Time When We Heed A Certain Call,” Life Magazine, April 
1985, 126. 
11
Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2003): 22-
23; John Ashworth, “The Relationship Between Capitalism and Humanitarianism,” The American 
Historical Review 92 (1987): 816.   
12
 Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: the making and unmaking of the world (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1985): 162. 
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and the south.13 With little or no individualization of the people photographed, the 
consumption of media images about the famine invested the reader with a 
significant amount of assumptive power over what constituted an appropriate 
famine victim. These assumptions would eventually inform the kind of 
purchasing decisions consumers made in the emergency, by inviting them to 
anchor these images with their own narratives of the famine.  
One of the most visible and cogent narratives used to make sense of the 
famine centered on the Cold War. The Life article highlighted the distinct Cold 
War discourse Americans incorporated in their reports of the famine. Speculation 
over how and why the Ethiopian government pursued certain food and emergency 
policies throughout the crisis served as an acknowledgement of deeper ideological 
forces at work and exposed how many Americans engaged with the political 
elements of the crisis.  Images of innocent famine victims suffering at the hands 
of an evil Marxist-Lenninist regime deployed a simplified political schema to 
interpret the crisis: the Ethiopian people, often viewed as childlike and innocent, 
suffered at the hands of the communists and American responsibility mandated 
that efforts be made to save them.14 References to this simplified understanding 
abounded. One article, for example, argued that before any progress could be 
made in the crisis, American leaders needed to recognize the root cause of the 
famine issue as a political consequence of a communist regime. The author 
admonished that before the US rush headlong into a relief effort they must 
recognize that “adverse weather conditions set the stage for Ethiopia’s disaster, 
but it is the political priorities of Ethiopia’s dictator, Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu 
Haile Mariam, that have crippled Ethiopian agriculture and reduced its ability to 
cope with the drought.”15  
The constant heralding of American progress contained distinct 
paternalistic threads and acted as at least one guide marker in America’s 
relationships and interactions with the world.16 Carmen Martinez Novo discusses 
paternalism as a subtler version of racism. In this form of racism dominant groups 
use discourses “that have discriminatory effects” which are “constructed as 
manifestations of love” for those who have been deemed different, childlike, and 
                                                          
13
 Alex de Waal, Evil Days: Thirty Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia (London: African Watch 
Report, 1991):39. 
14
 “Expulsions from Ethiopian Camp Suspected,” Washington Post, July 28, 1985, NARA Record 
Group 286, Media Folder 
15
 Edwin J. Jr., “A Plan for Rescuing Starving Ethiopians,” Washington Post, December 27, 1984.  
16
 Mary Renda’s Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915-
1940 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001): 89 and Melani McAllister gets at 
this in her work Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, & US Interests in the Middle East since 1945 
(Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005): 40 and 80-83 and her discussions of 
“benevolent supremacy.”  
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not equal.17 In the famine, racism coded as benevolent guidance shaped ideas of 
what did and did not constituted progress, infused media reports of the crisis, and 
acted as a litmus test of how Ethiopians responded to the emergency. News 
reports about daily life in the refugee camps gave readers a glimpse into Ethiopian 
lives and created comparisons between the “progress” of an American way of life 
and other more “primitive” cultures. Such comparisons tended to reveal the 
outcomes of “primitive” cultures as tragic and backward. In the Life article, for 
example, a graphic photograph shows a famine victim lying on her side on a bare 
floor covered by a blanket. Next to her legs is a newborn baby still attached by the 
umbilical cord.  A MSF midwife tells the reporter that although there is an 
obstetrics table available to the Ethiopian women, most “prefer to squat on a 
swatch of black plastic on the floor.” Embedded within this comment is the 
suggestion that Ethiopian women chose to remain outside any of the obstetrics 
technology that facilitates “positive outcomes.”   
Such a decision privileged Ethiopian women’s own understanding of the 
birthing process and the body’s ability to perform in that process over Western 
constructs of childbirth. The aid worker does goes on to say, “I knew this method 
of having babies was possible but I never saw it before…Now I think: Why not? 
It’s more natural.”18 However, this particular photo of a natural childbirth is 
placed next to photos of women delousing each other upon entrance to the camps 
and amidst other photos of starving bodies. Implied is the subtle suggestion that 
the preferred natural mode of childbirth, and the attending natural lifestyle, incurs 
substantial risks because it eschews the authoritative knowledge of medicine and 
technology that manages saving lives that is presented in popular culture 
references like movies and television shows.19 Here, “natural” stands in for 
“primitive.” In this particular scenario it becomes natural for aid workers, mostly 
Western, to step in and guide Ethiopian women in this emergency towards a more 
perfect understanding of how progress in areas like medicine can ease areas of 
their lives like childbirth. 
Utilizing a paternalistic discourse generated images and descriptions of 
Ethiopian famine victims as unable to meet their most basic needs and valorized 
the Western aid workers who acted on their behalf. According to the article, in 
many ways the aid workers of MSF, or Medicine San Frontiers, became the only 
conduit to survival. One photo underscores this with the image of a white, female 
                                                          
17
 Carmen Martinez Novo, Who Defines Indigenous: Identities, Development, Intellectuals, and 
the State in Northern Mexico (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2006): 10-11, 143-147. 
18
 David Breskin, “There Comes a Time When We Heed A Certain Call,” Life Magazine, April 
1985, 127.  
19
 Pamela K. Stone, “A History of Western Medicine, Labor, and Birth,” in Childbirth Across 
Cultures: Ideas and practices of pregnancy, childbirth, and the Postpartum, ed. Helaine Selin 
(Amherst: Springer Verlag, 2009), 50.  
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aid worker from MSF walking steadily ahead of a gaggle of children in her 
charge. She is quoted as saying after meeting with the RRC that, “I was really fed 
up after the meeting with the RRC…I wanted to leave. But if I can still help a few 
people, there is a reason to stay.” Rooted within this statement is hierarchy of 
power overlaid on a sense of need; the famine victims need her to stay because 
only she, or other aid workers like her, have the capacity to defend the victims 
from the Mengistu’s Marxist government. Another paragraph references Benedict 
Clement, a physician in the children’s ward, who is “lovingly called Mother by 
her patients.”20 In this case, Clemente is providing information, expertise, and 
care for her charges in a way that other Ethiopians cannot– not even their own 
mothers. Clement fulfills a filial role by acting as a mother defending her 
children, who happen to be Ethiopians of all ages. In still another description, 
readers are told that in the face of huge numbers of refugees coming into the 
camp, “six doctors, ten nurses and a midwife face the wall-to-wall crush with a 
kind of determined cheerfulness.”21 Readers, working from a strong heritage of 
stereotypes about Africa, are given the sense that the huge numbers of poor, 
pitiful victims are incapable of fending off the effects of Mengistu’s government 
on their own.22 Like children, they needed stronger, wiser adults to protect and 
defend them.  
Cold War and paternalistic discourse shaped the reception of the famine 
by American audiences and interjected a specific formulation of the outcome of 
the relief effort that surged forward. However, turning to traditional ideological 
explanations allowed followers of the emergency to work around the ambivalence 
surrounding the famine. Ideological explanations helped mask the racial 
underpinnings of famine representations because aid efforts were described as a 
way to guide and redirect childlike famine victims. Ethiopians and their nation 
had to be saved, but in emerging from the crisis they had to be a different kind of 
Ethiopian. Not only did their bodies require nourishment and sustenance, but they 
also needed to learn the behavioral principles of independence and choice-
making. Just as American children had to be instilled with core tenets of 
liberalism that focused on independence and choice-making in order to forge a 
life of prosperity, so, too did the figurative children of Ethiopia. As the 
ideological vision of Ethiopia as a stronger, more liberal people and nation took 
shape, Americans began placing greater claims on the relief effort and recipients 
of aid as a means to ensure that vision came to fruition.  
                                                          
20
 David Breskin, “There Comes a Time When We Heed A Certain Call,” Life Magazine, April 
1985, 127.  
21
 Ibid.  
22
 Amanda McVety, Enlightened Aid: U.S. Development as Foreign Policy in Ethiopia (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2012): 26-27; Matthew Frye Jacobson, Barbarian Virtues (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 2000): 105-109. 
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Seen in this light, viewers understood in the famine a dire need for 
outsiders to step in and act as defenders and provisioners of aid. In this story, the 
aid workers and volunteers take center stage as their actions are described as 
“heroic” and elevated to an almost celebrity-like status.  The plight of the famine 
victims becomes secondary to the bravery of the volunteers working on their 
behalf and suggests that without the vision of the aid workers miserable 
conditions will remain the status-quo. One grant submitted to the USAID 
explicitly speaks to the dire state of affairs in Africa that could potentially hamper 
even the efficiency of American aid workers if not carefully addressed.  The 
group AfriCare, a development organization that had been working in Africa 
since the 1970s, developed a grant project to place U.S. medical teams in the 
camp sites as a means to provide emergency medical assistance. Writing in line-
item justifications for a grant proposal submitted to USAID, the author noted that 
for those individuals volunteering to serve on the aid mission team, “the living 
conditions in the areas of Ethiopia in which they will be working…will involve 
major hardships for these individuals.”23 The grant went on to conclude that, “One 
has to actually visit the areas in question to have an idea of the emotional drain on 
the individuals faced with trying to maintain health services for the thousands of 
people facing starvation and living in conditions of absolute miser. In order to 
alleviate the strain on the volunteer personnel, AfriCare believes it is necessary to 
include some time during the period for the volunteers to get away from their 
depressing environment.”24 Ultimately, the author of the grant expects the cost of 
doing aid work in Africa to exact a high toll, but it is the expectation of a fruitful 
return that pushes the aid effort forward.  
Making cents: the problem of aid and the future of Ethiopia 
The first visual images and text of the famine stunned many Americans into 
action and relied on a well-known narrative to do so; the images created a story 
which cast the famine victims as apolitical pawns of a communist government 
that would undertake any lengths to strip people of freedom. Here, the association 
between children, innocence, and lack of political acumen played a central role in 
justifying the need for American donors to invest in the crisis with aid dollars, 
technology, and time. Colleen Williams, a concerned citizen, underscored this 
connection when she wrote to Vice President Bush that “my personal opinion on 
all this is I feel it was the Ethiopian government’s fault …. and I feel the 
Ethiopian people shouldn’t have to suffer for this.”25  
Dramatically increasing media attention on the crisis, highlighting 
                                                          
23
 Africare grant, page 17, NARA Record Group 286. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Letter to VP Bush, File Folder: Project Ethiopia, Drought Declared, Box 6, Record Group 286. 
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victims’ innocence, and emphasizing them as apolitical pawns in a communist 
game had two consequences. First, increased media attention triggered an 
emotional response from American viewers and prompted huge numbers of 
individuals to contribute to the Ethiopian aid effort.26 This effort coalesced into a 
world-wide care community in which amounts of money flowed from both large 
and small aid and relief groups into the aid effort in numbers never before seen.27  
Second, as this compassion collective grew, a loosely structured community 
developed and placed greater claims on the recipients of aid. They demanded 
Ethiopians transform their values and behaviors into usable, workable traits that 
would prevent such a tragedy from happening again. In this way, aid providers 
circumscribed the images of adult Africans as innocent children and informed the 
means through which individual and group donors approached aid efforts. 
Donations and relief efforts became as much about providing dollars as about 
grooming the “children” of Africa into responsible adults.  
The care community consisted of disparate segments that ranged from 
children, to businesses, to schools. Though the donations and offers of aid began 
as isolated, individual occasions to end suffering, eventually a loosely formed 
community formed around famine relief. Simplifying the political and historical 
context of the situation, media images of the disaster fostered a sense of urgency, 
and for a brief moment opened a window of imagined equality based on the 
vulnerability of broken and weakened bodies.28 Pulled by emotion and working 
under the vision of equality, people rallied to the aid effort. Many thousands of 
ordinary Americans called into relief centers asking how they could help and 
offering to donate money.29  
It wasn’t just adults that thought they could make a difference. In May of 
1985, the Los Angeles Unified School District spent two weeks pitting schools 
against each other to see which one would wind up on top as the number one 
fundraiser for money for Ethiopian famine victims. They aimed to raise $250,000 
for needed supplies in the country. The ultimate goal of the campaign was to 
“help stop the dying and instill in students a sense of caring for the plight of 
others.”30 The strategies various schools employed to raise money were wide-
                                                          
26
 Fassin argues that emergencies attract large numbers of people in the early stages b/c of 
imagined equality 
27
 Jonathan Benthall, Disasters, Relief, and Media (UK: Sean Kingston Press, 2010); Clifford 
May, “U.S. Will Give Development Aid to Ethiopia,” New York Times, May 9, 1985; Joseph 
Berger, “Offers of Aid for Stricken Ethiopia Are Pouring Into Relief Agencies,” New York Times, 
October 26, 1984. 
28
 Didier Fassin, Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present Times, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2012). 
29
 Interaction Grant, NARA Record Group 286. 
30
“Valley Schools Pitch In: Students’ Initiative Boosts Famine Aid,” Los Angeles Times, May 25, 
1985. 
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ranging. Some presided over auctions, others held dances, and others had foreign-
food sales, a riff on the usual bake sales common to school functions. Students did 
manage to reach their fundraising goal. One school alone, Birmingham High 
School, presented a check to the school board for $8,018.18.31 One school council 
member said of the reason for so much student involvement, “I think maybe kids 
are coming out of their apathy…..People are becoming aware of the world again. 
But it seems like it’s the ‘in’ thing to be concerned about.”  
With a growing community involved in the famine and as more people 
entered into this community, expectations grew around the outcome of donation 
relief.  Coalescing around a set identity and experience of caring for others, media 
recognition of this group effort imbued large and small donors with a sense of 
power over where their money went and how it was spent. Alluding to a 
disagreement between Ethiopia and the United States over the extent of aid in 
relation to the proportion of famine, media headlines cited relief officials 
declaring that Ethiopia was “biting the hand the feeds it.”32 Such sentiments were 
embedded within a hierarchy of power relations between nation-states and jarred 
with the rhetoric of Americans giving aid freely to any in need.33 Individual 
donors, for example, clamored for a visible return on the money they donated and 
still felt disappointment years later when Ethiopia faced the prospect of another 
devastating famine in 2004. During the relief effort of 2004, one radio caller 
“expressed irritation and outrage that Ethiopia was still in crisis fifteen years later 
after she had donated money to the Band-Aid appeal in the mid-1980s. What had 
happened to all the money, she demanded. And why couldn’t Ethiopia look after 
itself? The programmer presenter asked whether she would be donating money to 
the relief effort this time. ‘Certainly not,’ she replied.”34 The sense of monetary 
accountability pervaded reports of the relief effort so thoroughly that one report 
cautioned against too much expectation. He discussed the difficulty of 
administering aid in famine-stricken areas and wrote that donors “must deal with 
one of the world’s least attractive governments. But this can be done without 
illusion and with an honest reckoning to Americans who contributed so much to 
Ethiopian relief.”35 
 Public understanding of the famine soon coupled monetary accountability 
with ideological accountability. Heeding a certain call meant that many in the 
United States, and other countries, understood this humanitarian disaster as an 
                                                          
31
 “Birmingham Students Present Famine Check,” Los Angeles Times, June 7, 1985.  
32
 Irvin Molotsky, “Relief Official Accuses Ethiopia of ‘Biting the Hand’ that Feeds it,” New York 
Times, December 13, 1984.  
33
 Jennifer Hyndman, Managing Displacement: Refugees and the Politics of Humanitarianism 
(Minneapolist: University of Minnesota Press, 2000): 20. 
34
 Peter Biles, “Too Great  a Burden,” The World Today 56 (2000):4-6. 
35
 “Feeding Ethiopia, Without Illusions,” New York Times, January 19, 1985.   
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opportunity for ordinary Americans to collectively remake conditions in the world 
which precipitated suffering and deprivation. Popular culture magazines provided 
a simple answer to frustrations with conditions like those in Ethiopia that allowed 
famines to take place. One reader summed up this sentiment when they wrote in 
to the editor that, “The next time someone tells me the world is going downhill, 
I’ll just remember what 43 of the biggest names in in music did to make it better. 
It took USA for Africa to make me realize that I, too, can help!.”36  
Other facets of the emergency soon emerged that contributed to donor 
expectations, including anxieties about race. As the aid campaign took form 
through direct relief programming and development activities, deeply political 
assumptions about dependency, aid, and race in the domestic context informed the 
creation of those initiatives taking place at the international level. Domestically, 
race framed an on-going debate concerning the abuse of government sponsored 
programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).37 Although 
by the time of the Ethiopian famine “racial science had long been discredited 
among scientists and physical anthropologists,” many Americans still continued 
to use racial categorization as a way to explain contemporary political contexts.38 
Images and a discourse of African-American mothers on welfare and abusing the 
program flourished.39 As a result, stereotypes of African-Americans as lazy and 
dependent took root, and the role of welfare remained heatedly debated in the 
creation of a productive citizenry.40 
The Ethiopian famine magnified the discourse around dependency and aid, 
and placing the conversation in the international arena heightened an awareness of 
what was at stake with aid.  With current domestic aid debates acting as the 
backdrop, many donors feared that aid could sap the industriousness and vitality 
of Ethiopia’s future. Instead, what would emerge was a nation dependent on other 
nations – a macrocosm of what was happening with aid in the United States.  To 
avoid this fate, many American donors made greater ideological claims on the 
recipients of aid during the famine based on fears that a proliferation of 
unmanaged aid would create a world that discouraged the full manifestation of a 
thriving, liberal atmosphere and the attending freedoms, privileges, and rights.  
As discussions around aid need and delivery progressed, issues over 
dependent behavior emerged as the core site for individual and national 
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 “Letters to the Editor,” Life Magazine, April 1985.  
37
 Thomas Sugrue, Sweet Land of Liberty: The Forgotten Struggle For Civil Rights in the North 
(New York: Random House, 2008): 394-396, 519-521, 524-529. 
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 Melani McAllister, Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, & US Interests in the Middle East since 
1945 (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005): 148. 
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transformation and created fertile ground for donors to make claims on aid 
recipients. A post-famine Ethiopia had to include people who were diligent, hard-
working, and able to fully contribute to the success of the nation through labor. In 
June 1985, a month before the largest fundraising event of the famine campaign 
took place with the dual concerts, Gerry Salole voiced concerns that the massive 
amount of aid destined for Ethiopia opened the possibility of sabotaging that 
nation’s future by engraining a sense of entitlement in famine victims’ perception 
of their circumstances. Salole, the field director for Save the Children, implied 
that receiving such a large amount of aid in such a short time period would 
cultivate a sense of dependency.41 He elaborated on these fears when he stated, 
“We need to try to understand what happens to people who are getting something 
for nothing… This has to be creating bizarre ideas about those who are providing 
the relief and generally what the world is like.” In articulating uneasiness with the 
relationship between aid and its recipients, Salole raised questions about the 
management and end-result of aid. He suggested that if aid continued unabated 
without some kind of investment or repayment from the victim, the victim would 
first, develop a misconception about how the world functioned and the place of 
progressive, advanced nations within that structure, and second, be stripped of any 
desire to develop skills needed to participate in that world. In this case, unless 
carefully supervised, aid efforts would produce the opposite of productive 
citizens.   
As Salole raised concerns among the public through news reports, other 
private aid groups took their concerns directly to USAID officials. Some pushedd 
for a solution to the famine that would span a greater timeline beyond money 
earmarked for only a short period of time within the 1985 fiscal year. Interaction, 
the large umbrella organization of over 100 private volunteer agencies, did just 
that. In a letter to the chairman of the committee that introduced HR 100 and HR 
606, the President of the organization, Peter J. Davies, wrote that the group 
commended the legislation which “would provide both higher levels of funding 
and a broader range of assistance, including assistance for recovery and 
rehabilitation. It is our strongly held view that assistance for recovery and 
rehabilitation is just as important as emergency aid. Indeed, unless we make the 
extra efforts now to assist African countries in such undertakings as 
redevelopment of water resources and rehabilitation and improvement of 
agricultural production, we risk increasing their dependence on food aid handouts 
instead of encouraging greater self-reliance.”42 
If the public and private agencies concerns overlapped about the 
destructive tendency of food aid to foster dependence and entitlement thereby 
displacing the values of responsibility, self-reliance, and hard-work, government 
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workers within the USAID also remained sensitive to these anxieties. Indeed, 
documents circulating in the department since April 1984 revealed that USAID 
continued to struggle with the same questions that the public and private aid 
groups held over the future of aid and relief.  A speech entitled  “Disasters: Acts 
of God or Acts of Man?”, delivered to the World Affairs Council of Northern 
California on April 5, 1984 made its way to the desks of USAID officials. The 
speech resonated with workers and made clear arguments that answered many 
questions about the meaning of aid assistance. A hand written note at the top of 
the speech claimed, “Excellent speech, should be read by everyone in our 
business.”43 The initials JM followed the comment.44   
The speech opens with a vignette about a disastrous earthquake that struck 
Lisbon in 1755. After discussing the reaction to the disaster by the public, to the 
author asks audience members to whether “natural disasters – floods, droughts, 
famines, hurricanes, tsunamis and the like as well as earthquakes – are Acts of 
God or acts of man.”45 In a few simple sentences he forces his audience to 
consider that “when disasters happen in the Third World, and droughts and 
famines seem to be on the increase in Latin America, Asia and Africa, do we react 
properly? Is disaster relief part of the solution – or part of the problem?”46 After 
surveying a range of disasters, including the contemporaneous famine in Ethiopia, 
for his audience, the speaker begins an analysis of the responses to these 
emergencies. He concludes that “one of the myths about disasters is that after an 
earthquake or a flood, or during a famine, people sit around in numbed 
helplessness waiting for helicopters to fly in with blankets and food. The truth is 
almost exactly the opposite: it is the delivery of food and blankets which causes 
this dependence and inactivity.”47 The sentiments voiced in this speech which 
circulated through USAID offices, echoed the same concerns about the 
consequences of aid that started surfacing in the media. For many, aid represented 
a fine line: too little and America would be shirking its duty to help heal the world 
and change its course, too much and America contributed to the further 
degeneration of individual potential. Misdirected aid risked dangerous 
consequences.  
Without properly managing aid, famine victims risked becoming 
dependent on others for survival and in that process faced regressing into acts of 
                                                          
43
 John Tinker, “Disasters: Acts of God or Acts of Man?” Speech to the World Affairs Council of 
Northern California, April 1984, page 1, NARA, Record Group 286.  
44
 Although there is no conclusive proof, it can be speculated that this was the signature of Julius 
Marks, a high-ranking USAID official. 
45
 John Tinker, “Disasters: Acts of God or Acts of Man?” Speech to the World Affairs Council of 
Northern California, April 1984, page 1, NARA, Record Group 286.  
46
 Ibid.  
47
Ibid, 14.  
 America and the 1984-1986 Ethiopian Famine 94 
 
dishonesty and idleness. Taking seriously the consequences on Ethiopia’s future, 
aid donors, workers, and officials set out to ensure that a future of idle, dependent 
Ethiopians did not occur. They did this by building new cultural expectations 
around work habits in carefully managed aid distribution centers.48 Salole 
proposed an unofficial solution to the dilemma of dependence by encouraging 
food recipients to actively participate in the relief effort by contributing their 
labor. He noted that a form of this plan was currently in place in certain areas near 
food camps where volunteers built and repaired the dirt roads that Save the 
Children’s trucks used. Meanwhile, other aid recipients used their donkeys to 
transport food to remote villages. Salole summed up the effort by saying “They’re 
not being paid in money or food, they’re doing it as volunteers. That way they 
become participants in, rather than objects of the relief effort.” Most importantly, 
Salole concluded that “people who work for what they receive are less likely to 
come away with the impression that free food is something to which they have 
permanently become entitled.”49 For Salole, current aid operations represented a 
danger to the larger world structure by enabling dependency. He stated, that in its 
current form, “Relief means you can come in and say, ‘Here’s the food, take it.’” 
For Salole and other donors like him, relief operations needed a major 
readjustment in order to create a new, world that tamped down on dependent 
behaviors that exacerbated, or even caused, emergency situations.  
Although some media reports did applaud the resiliency of Ethiopian men, 
women, and children, it was clear that aid experts felt they needed to properly 
manage and channel inner resources like resiliency as a means to guard against 
dependency. Without direct supervision and management of aid, officials like 
Salole wondered  “whether aid provided over a long period may not stifle the 
initiative of the recipient” and render them incompetent for a future that required 
productivity and industry for survival.50 In part, such a view stemmed from the 
juxtaposition of camps, described as a location of progress, technology, and 
comfort, and Ethiopian terrain, described as a Biblical backwater.51 Survivors 
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spent time in camps that were outfitted with “large water-proof tents, street lights, 
generators, a hospital, free, hot food and guards at the gate” and which were seen 
as “a functioning town with far more amenities than its inhabitants have ever 
known before or are likely to know again.” Observers noted that leaving “such an 
environment can be traumatic.” Such a line of reasoning reinforced concerns 
about dependency  and expressed wonder at the apparent willingness of survivors 
to remain in a place of comfort that they did not contribute to making.52 Even as 
aid workers on the ground and in the urgency of the operation developed make-
shift and ad-hoc aid revisions, like Salole’s labor contribution program, the 
USAID also worked to re-make conditions in the camps that would alter and 
modify certain behaviors.  The kind of aid projects chosen for US funding, hinged 
on the kinds of goals and aims they articulated in their grant applications. Many 
of those chosen targeted the very anxieties over aid-dependency and the 
production of liberal citizens that concerned government employees like Julius 
Marks.  
Remaking the World: Grant-making, claim-making, and the future of 
Ethiopia 
In spite of Reagan’s staunch reputation as a Cold War warrior, during this period 
his public stance towards the larger Cold War conflict edged towards an 
appearance of rapprochement as he sought to balance the demands of anti-Soviet 
fervor and peace brokers within his administration.53 With more public emphasis 
on returning to warmer relations and promises to avoid military conflicts, White 
House officials also focused on alternatives to further their vision of a free-market 
world order while appearing as the broker of a rapprochement with the Soviets.54 
Publicly, in the spirit of the olive branch, they took care to rebuild cultural 
relations and work together on science matters like space initiatives.55 Behind the 
scenes, however, less conspicuous means offered a way for Reagan to assuage the 
concerns of staunch Cold War warriors who feared that Soviet strength would 
outpace the capabilities of the US.56 Officials found one such conduit in the form 
of emergency aid grants and immediate relief projects that worked to rebuild 
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Ethiopia in the image of a liberal state. The 1984-1985 famine functioned as an 
important space to implement such projects. Acting on the impulses of public 
concern, spurred in large part by media images of the famine, the US government 
officially sanctioned and funded private, non-profit programs whose project aims 
tied neatly with a neoliberal vision of the future. While on the surface, non-profits 
and the US government often appeared at odds, with one favoring liberal agendas 
and the other favoring a conservative course, their aims dovetailed neatly because 
of the ways each worked in relation to neoliberalism. Reagan’s overt policies and 
actions to create a state and world that favored individual property rights, the rule 
of law, and institutions of free markets and free trade were supplemented by many 
NGOs more subtle measures to shape individual characteristics that would 
flourish in such a world.57  
In order for the world Reagan and his officials envisioned to survive, 
reformers needed to do more than simply forestall dependency. Famine victims 
had to learn new skills and attitudes, such as increasing productivity, shoring up 
self-reliance, and goal tending, to equip them for the coming liberal oriented 
world. Thus, the White House had a special interest in partnering with groups that 
encouraged and helped bring about these behaviors in famine victims. If aid 
workers on the ground improvised with the behavior transforming programs they 
implemented, like Salole’s volunteer contribution program, the White House 
agencies like the USAID  directed a more methodical and sustainable campaign to 
achieve similar results. Three USAID funded  projects in particular highlight 
White House interest in transformative aid: the CRS health-nutrition surveillance 
program, the tent cities of Nathan Abbie, and the well-drilling campaign of 
AfriCare. 
Because of the vast amount of work that would need to go into the 
transformation of Ethiopia as a result of its underdevelopment, how recipients 
used the aid they received developed into a source of contention between donors 
and victims. In particular, the use and abuse of food-rations became an important 
site for transformation. Many donors and media viewers who contributed to the 
campaign understood the relief camps and feeding centers as a microcosm of the 
progress of the Western world.58 In detailing camp life, reporters focused on the 
victims’ desire to remain in the camps in order to take advantage of technology 
and progress. Some of these stories emphasized the lengths that aid recipients 
went to in order to remain in the camp and be spared the “trauma” of returning to 
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a life without Western amenities. In particular, reporters seized on Ethiopian 
mothers that “nutritionally sabotaged” their children – a condition in which 
reportedly mothers kept at least one of their children in a malnourished state so 
that her family would not be turned away from the camps.59 While Ethiopian 
mothers may have understood this particular use of food as a survival mechanism 
for her entire family, aid workers equated it to thievery and manipulation of the 
aid system.60 The message sent by news reporters and aid workers throughout the 
famine concluded that a future Ethiopia, which included technology and 
amenities, entailed cultivating behaviors of honesty, responsibility, and 
accountability in famine victims. Like aid disputes taking place in the United 
States, there was no room in Ethiopia’s future for mothers who used their children 
to take advantage of the system.  
A USAID funded Catholic Relief Services project, the Nutritional 
Surveillance program, worked to transform behaviors deemed deceptive by 
closely managing and shaping individual norms. This program focused on 
mothers and children. As children and mothers received their food rations, 
program managers also gave them nutrition training. The program closely tracked 
and monitored participants through weigh-ins. It was expected that participants 
would apply their nutritional training towards the rations they received and thus 
experience a weight-gain in malnourished children. An important component of 
this program centered on the ideas of community sharing in Ethiopian culture. 
According to the grant authors, many of the destitute adults receiving food aid 
intended for children took the ration and shared it amongst other family and 
possibly community members. To ensure that the ration intended for the children 
went undivided, the program monitored the weight of each child enrolled in the 
program and provided extra rations to other adults.  
Dividing the use of rations, thus preventing the sense of communal 
sharing, spoke to the differences in how aid providers and famine victims 
understood tragedy or celebration. Preventing sharing of rations emphasized the 
individual experience of suffering and foreclosed the communal experience of 
tragedy. Accordingly, as NGOs elevated the individual experience of suffering, 
they also foregrounded and privileged the individual basis for overcoming 
adversity and challenge. Seen in this light, the feeding program helped condition 
participants for the rigors of the modern, neoliberal world. Success in this new 
world required that individuals understand the importance of self-reliance and 
individualism. Participating in the nutrition program allowed Ethiopian mothers 
and children the means to gain this crucial experience.  
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The second proposed project, the drilling of wells, managed to elevate 
efficiency and goal-orientation as the key aspect of survival in the post-famine 
Ethiopia. In December 1984 USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance 
commissioned a report on the state of water accessibility and cleanliness near the 
displacement camps. As the numbers of displaced persons swelled the relief 
centers, camp resources failed to grow accordingly. Water access proved a 
growing concern as only a limited number of water wells throughout the camps 
had to sustain thousands of campers. In the Bhati Camp, because water access 
was insufficient people soon began using nearby river water even though it was 
contaminated. Camp authorities deployed fifty-three external “sanitation guards” 
to keep people away from the river bed.  
Unable to utilize the river and only having access to a few water pumps 
meant that 300 to 400 people had to wait for water on a daily basis. In their 
investigation of the camps, the project managers noted the response of the camp 
doctor towards these conditions, “The doctor did not seem concerned about the 
300 to 400 people waiting for water. He agreed that it would be better if they had 
more water but thought the waiting was beneficial to the people as it gave them a 
goal, something to do, in the very act of waiting they thought they were working 
for their water.”61 For the report preparers, the use of time played an important 
role in how they interpreted camp life. The doctor understood waiting as an action 
that gave hope, or a moment of meaning, in a life overshadowed by death. The 
report preparers on the other hand, understood waiting in a much different light.62 
Waiting for water represented a passive use of time when the urgency of the 
situation required much more active measures. Time was a crucial ingredient in 
saving lives and the idea of hundreds of people using time to wait, rather than act, 
violated western norms of efficiency and goal orientation – if the goal of camp 
life was survival, then campers needed to be doing more than simply waiting 
passively to receive water. Building multiple and permanent well sites served as a 
way to save lives by providing access to clean water. But it also served as an 
important example of aid donors’ understanding of how to use time.  Establishing 
multiple well sites subverted the camp doctor’s understanding of what marked a 
productive goal. Rather than simply waiting in line, displaced persons in the camp 
could actively shape their own destiny by more efficiently using time.63   
 In addition to developing specific liberal behaviors such as individual 
accountability (through the nutrition program) and teaching habits that were 
crucial to a liberal work-ethic like managing time more efficiently (through the 
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well-project), USAID funded projects also worked to foster the importance of 
choice-making in everyday life circumstances, a habit that many felt was missing 
under Marxist rule. Although many Western viewers internalized the victims as 
child-like in their lack of political acumen, an expectation arose that such an 
apolitical state was only temporary. With appropriate training and opportunities, 
victims could take control of their future through the kinds of choices that they 
made. In this way famine victims would grow into responsible beings and 
political adults. In ascribing choice-making, or a lack there-of, as an important 
feature of the crises, Western media and relief projects pointed to the role of 
Mengistu’s government in the creation and sustainment of the famine through the 
ways in which they stripped Ethiopians of their right to make choices about where 
and how they lived.  
Doubts loomed over Mengistu’s intentions to end the famine. Reports 
suggested that his aid program and the use of the Ethiopian Relief and 
Rehabilitation Committee served as a rouse for squelching the rebels who lived 
primarily in famine-stricken areas.  Megnistu’s resettlement program served as an 
important focal point for these doubts. Resettlement efforts began in earnest in 
October 1984 by Ethiopian officials as an attempt to stem the death toll by 
moving people from drought stricken Northern provinces in Tigrea and Eritrea to 
more fertile lands in the South near the Kishe province.64 Mengistu officials 
described the program as completely voluntary and one administrator stated that 
he was “surprised by the large outpouring of volunteers” and claiming that there 
was “no problem” getting people to relocate.”65 Mengistu initiated resettlement in 
order to actively solve the hunger problem.66 When describing the plan to 
Western donors, he insisted that those that resettled did so voluntarily. Many in 
the Reagan administration refused to believe the resettlement program was 
anything other than an attempt to institute forcible collectivization on the peasant 
population. Some international aid groups fed this suspicion when they 
questioned the tactics used to recruit volunteers to the resettlement areas in 
Southern Ethiopia.67 One Red Cross official stated that “we don’t know the 
degree to which they are being forced and we don’t know the risks to which 
they’ll be exposed.”68 Statements from those who had been resettled appeared to 
corroborate these doubts as one peasant “complained that they would need 
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bulldozers to clear rocks and trees and tractors to turn the hard virgin soil.”69 Such 
comments drew readers’ attention towards the possibility that not all of the 
resettlers moved of their own accord. Newspaper and television characterizations 
of the government painted a picture of Ethiopian officials working to strip 
individuals of essential liberties such as freedom of movement.  
Public questions over Megnistu’s motivations came as a boon to U.S. 
officials who knew of the famine conditions in Ethiopia long before the breaking 
coverage of Buerke’s news documentary, but were reluctant to do anything to 
ameliorate the situation.70 At least two years prior to the sweeping news stories of 
famine in Africa, Reagan officials opted not to provide aid to a communist 
government.71 They reasoned that providing funds to Mengistu’s leadership 
would only help the burgeoning leftist country realize national socialistic goals.72 
The increased numbers of letters sent into USAID reminding those officials that 
“something must be done, current efforts were to be commended, but they were 
not enough,” made it clear that a reckoning was about to take place.73 A press 
release from Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, co-sponsor of the African Famine, 
Relief, and Recovery Act of 1985, summed up this response when he wrote that, 
“The continuing drought that has afflicted eight African nations in the past decade 
has put at risk an estimated 10 million human beings. Since October 1, 1984 the 
United States has shipped an estimated 700,000 metric tons of emergency food to 
famine-stricken regions of Africa. This is a good start, but it is not enough.”74 
Official U.S. policy could no longer ignore circumstances in Ethiopia hoping that 
widespread disease and death would topple Mengistu. Acting against the 
backdrop of the public’s outcry USAID reworked official policy to their benefit. 
If they were to help a communist nation, it would be on their ideological terms. 
Luckily for them, it appeared as though the public was on board, and even set the 
pace, for those terms. In this way, as the US became a leader in providing aid to 
Ethiopia, they were also able to fulfill policy goals through their collaboration 
with non-profit aid groups.75  
Reagan officials did this by placing non-negotiable conditions on 
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emergency aid delivered by the US.76 One of these non-negotiable conditions was 
the location and placement of aid. Throughout the famine, the White House 
insisted USAID only provide aid to non-resettlement areas.77 One important 
example of this policy manifested in the creation of tent-cities. Israeli activist-
philanthropist Abie Nathan, working through the American Jewish Committee, 
submitted a grant to build an emergency tent city. His intended plan was to build a 
safe, sanitary city to act as a relief center for famine victims. Victims arriving in 
the cities would find tents to live in and relief to help end hunger. Wary at first, 
the US soon described the tent-city as an acceptable plan and if funded it would 
“be money well spent.”78 They supported the grant under condition of strict 
controls to where Abbie built the cities. Any site had to receive US approval 
before any construction could take place. Approved areas meant any land that was 
not part of Mengistu’s resettlement schemes that had caused such consternation in 
Western media reports. Many of these landed in famine stricken areas that also 
happened to be controlled by Ethiopian groups rebelling against Mengistu’s 
leadership.  
Funding tent cities in rebel controlled areas helped politicize the 
emergency and reinforced questions about Mengistu’s resettlement scheme and 
the nature of a communist government in its relationship to citizens’ rights. 
Although the tent cities served as a means of relief, they also served as an 
important contrast to the assumed forced resettlement scheme of Mengistu and 
became emblematic of the importance of choice-making in individual life. In US 
funded tent-cities famine victims had the choice of where, when, and how to seek 
aid. They could go as far or as near their homes as they liked. This served as an 
important foil to reports about the lack of choice-making in resettled areas. 
Newspapers reported the resettled areas as places where victims were told when 
and where they had to report. In addition, journalists portrayed resettled areas as 
also affecting the daily lives of every other Ethiopian who did not face starvation; 
taking away choice from one group entailed denying choice for other groups. 
Journalist Clifford May reported on compulsory activity when he wrote of the 
“thousands of Ethiopian college students and teachers” who were “ordered to 
spend the summer working with famine victims” who had been resettled in the 
south and west of the country. One student stated of his assignment, “I don’t 
know anything about plowing or building tukuls (traditional thatched huts used by 
Ethiopian peasants.”79  
Also reported in the article were concerns about what resettlement meant 
for the future of Ethiopian famine victims. One aid official stated that the 
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resettlement scheme had been poorly designed and that “those being resettled 
have little chance to become self-sufficient soon.”80 The victims’ passage into 
adulthood and beyond the famine crisis depended, in part, on their ability to make 
decisions free from government interference, and the tent cities represented an 
oasis in a land dominated by government interference. In this way, tent cities 
allowed the US government to emphasize the importance of giving individuals the 
freedom to make choices that could and would lead to health and happiness in 
life. In keeping famine victims out of resettlement areas, the US worked to 
undermine Mengistu’s policies and served as a way to keep the act of choice-
making a relevant point of concern in the eyes of American donors. 
Conclusion 
Ultimately, the undercurrent of doubt about the aid campaign and the ensuing 
work to save bodies firmly rested on understanding aid as a transaction. Media 
interpretations of the crisis opened space for Westerners to place claims on the 
victims by re-casting Ethiopians in pejorative, childlike caricatures reminiscent of 
early depictions of Africans and African-Americans.  The larger Cold-War 
background further simplified the situation for many Americans. In stripping the 
famine of its political complexity and suggesting that Africa needed saving from 
the evils of communist leaders, donors imbued the famine with an ideological use; 
providing money to Ethiopian famine victims transformed them into tools to save 
the world from Communists and allowed donors to regenerate Ethiopian values 
and behaviors appropriate to a world free from socialism. As development and 
relief merged, the kinds of programs chosen as recipients of federal dollars reveal 
how the means to save bodies were also intended to transform those bodies into a 
new neoliberal citizen at the conclusion of the famine. The public played a key 
role in pushing the Reagan administration into creating preemptive relief and aid 
policies by relying heavily on non-profit groups which resulted in closer 
relationships between private non-profit groups and US aid agencies. This newly 
cemented relationship provided alternative means for the United States to pursue 
Cold War policies amidst the evolving relationship between the United States and 
the Soviet Union.81 This changed relationship allowed the US to cede much of its 
authority in managing many future human rights and humanitarian crises to 
private groups.  
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